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Abstract: The use of technical supervision as a probation process in the criminal trial is a topical issue, 
given that in recent years information and communication technologies have considerably increased 
the ability to collect, process and disseminate information.Technological progress results in the secrecy 
of correspondence being increasingly difficult to keep, and the technical means of supervision will 
always be one step ahead of legislation.Given the evolution of investigative methods in the criminal 
process, privacy protection has become a natural concern of the EU member states legislative 
authorities.Interference with private life is a controversial subject questioning the renunciation at 
privacy, as the general interest of the society, represented by the repression of crimes with a high degree 
of social danger, prevails over the private one. 
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Introduction 
The notion of technical surveillance concerns the intervention of the authorized 
bodies in any kind of conversations or communications by telephone or other means 
of communication, not public, involving the idea of confidentiality between the 
participants. 
These means of proof were appreciated as representing a modernization of the 
probation system in the criminal trial, underlining that the possibilities of falsifying 
the obtained data are counteracted by the measures for their prevention and 
verification. (Gradinaru, 2014) 
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In the context of the evolution of technology, the legislation of the world states is 
constantly adapting, and in order to ensure effective judicial cooperation, it tends to 
harmonize laws as well as to regulate unambiguous provisions.  
Thus, each legislation regulates differently the conditions that need to be met for 
issuing a mandate to authorize the use of the electronic surveillance procedure. The 
applicant must generally demonstrate that the use of electronic surveillance is 
necessary either in the interests of national security or for the purpose of preventing 
or investigating crimes. 
Sometimes, for the use of interception devices, the applicant must demonstrate that 
the offense in question falls within the category of “serious crimes”, which is 
variable from state to state. 
Under the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(UNCTOC)1, a serious offense is the act which, under national law, is punishable by 
four years of imprisonment or more. Although sovereigns regarding the regulation 
of the electronic surveillance procedure, the signatory states need to consider 
whether the regime imposed by national law on electronic surveillance is in line with 
the Convention. 
Some states in the European Union use the special punishment maximum as a 
benchmark for considering a crime as “serious”, while others have drawn up a list of 
offenses considered “serious crimes”. 
However, some offenses appear to occur almost universally. These include 
investigating terrorist offenses, treason and serious violent crimes such as murder or 
kidnapping.  
Often, legislation will explicitly indicate the factors that need to be considered for 
issuing an intercept order. The basis for such a request will be that there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that a relevant offense has been, is or will be 
committed.  
Other factors that need to be examined are the probative value of the evidence to be 
obtained through electronic surveillance, the opportunity of alternative probative 
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procedures and the condition that the mandate issued is in the interest of the 
administration of justice. 
From a criminal-law point of view, the scale of the criminal phenomenon and the 
evolution of technology impose a continuous adaptation of normative regulations, 
which requires an analysis of the various laws that have achieved greater success in 
combating and preventing crime. (Gradinaru, p. 364)1 
 
Technical Surveillance in the Romanian Criminal Procedure Code 
In the Romanian legal system, technical surveillance measures are expressly 
provided by art. 139 of the Criminal procedure code. 
Within the text of the law, special technical surveillance measures are listed 
expressly and limitatively: interception of communications and communications, 
access to a computer system, video, audio or photo surveillance, location or tracking 
by technical means and obtaining data on financial transactions of a person. 
(Gradinaru, 2015, p. 39) 
The conditions to be met in order to allow for technical surveillance measures to be 
authorized by the judge of rights and freedoms are provided cumulatively by the text 
of art. 139 par. 1 of the Criminal Procedure Code: 
“(1) there is reasonable suspicion as to the preparation or commission of an offense 
referred to in paragraph (2); 
(2) the measure should be proportionate to the restriction of fundamental rights and 
freedoms, given the particularities of the case, the importance of the information or 
evidence to be obtained or the seriousness of the offense; 
(3) the evidence could not otherwise be obtained or the obtaining thereof would 
entail particular difficulties which would prejudice the investigation or there is a 
danger to the safety of persons or property”. 
Also, the offenses in respect of which technical surveillance measures may be 
authorized are expressly provided by the text of art. 139 par. 2 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code: “in the case of the offenses against national security provided by 
the Criminal Code and special laws, as well as in the cases of drugs or arms 
trafficking, human trafficking, terrorism, falsification of coins or other values, 
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falsification of electronic payment instruments, crimes against patrimony, blackmail, 
rape, kidnaping, tax evasion, in the case of corruption offenses and crimes 
assimilated to corruption offenses, offenses against the financial interests of the 
European Union, of criminal offenses committed through computer systems or 
electronic means of communication, or in respect of other offenses for which the law 
provides for imprisonment of five years or more”. 
Thus, according to art. 139 and 140 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the power to 
order the issuance of the warrant belongs to the judge of rights and freedoms from 
the court which would have jurisdiction to judge the case in the first instance. 
However, in case of an emergency, when the delay in obtaining the authorization 
would seriously damage the prosecution activity, the prosecutor by motivated 
ordinance, may provisionally order the technical surveillance measures for a 
maximum of 48 hours. 
As for the maximum period in which technical surveillance methods can be used by 
the authorities, the mandate is issued for a maximum of 30 days, period that may be 
extended at the request of the prosecutor, by the judge of rights and freedoms, each 
extension being also a maximum of 30 days. The total duration of authorized 
technical surveillance measures with respect to the same person and the same offense 
may not exceed 6 months, except for the measure of video, audio, or photo 
surveillance in private areas, which may not exceed 120 days. (Gradinaru, 2012, pp. 
50-55)1 
It is relevant that the decision of the judge of rights and freedoms by which the 
issuing of the mandate or the confirmation of the prosecutor's order is final is not 
susceptible to be appealed. 
The majority of national court decisions reveals that the judge`s for rights and 
freedoms rulings trough which a measure of technical surveillance is authorized are 
subject to judicial control in preliminary chamber. (Gradinaru, 2016) 
Given the above, we believe that would be appropriate to corroborate the provisions 
of special laws with those of the Criminal Procedure Code and with the relevant 
jurisprudence of the European Court regarding conditions permit, the magistrate 
empowered to give authorization, special laws still referring to prosecutors, 
maximum period of authorization, clearly defining the categories of offenses and 
persons likely to be subject of interceptions, conditions, procedures and institutions 
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- categories of experts responsible for verifying the authenticity of the recordings. 
(Gradinaru, 2013, pp. 68-72)1 
Thus, given that current technology allows easy falsification of records, where there 
are such suspicions, at the prosecutor's request, or the parties or ex officio, the court 
may order technical expertise of the recordings to verify their the authenticity and 
continuity. If it is found, after examination, the lack of authenticity of the records or 
interfering mixes in the text or removal of passages of conversation, they cannot be 
retained in the case and cannot be used as evidence. (Gradinaru, Checking 
interceptions and audio video recordings by the Court after referral, 2012)2 
 
Comparative European Union Member States Law 
The possibility of intercepting the telecommunication and informatics systems is 
provided in the legislation of all democratic states in the European Union, but we 
need to take into consideration art. 8 of ECHR on private and family life, its aim 
being to defend the individual against any interference of the public authorities3. 
(Girbulet & Gradinaru, 2012, pp. 90-100) 
In article 8 of the European Convention of the Human Rights1, having the title “The 
right to respect private and family life” it is specified that: “any person has the right 
to respect their private and family life, their home and correspondence.” That is why 
it is not admitted the interference of a public authority in exerting this right but as 
long as this interference is specified by the law and if it represents a measure that is 
necessary for the public safety, national security, economic welfare of the country, 
the defense of order and the prevention of penal acts, as well as the protection of 
health or others’ rights and liberties. 
As for the phone interceptions, the Court states that, even though paragraph 1 of 
article 8 does not mention the phone conversations, they are implied, being 
comprised in the notions of “private life’ and “correspondence” taken into account 
by the text.  
Therefore, it is tackled if the public prosecutors or the judges are competent in 
suggesting and reducing the scope of some fundamental rights outside the criminal 
                                                             
1, available online at: http://www.proceedings.univ-danubius.ro/index.php/eirp/article 
/view/1444/1333. 
2 Available online at: http://proceedings.univ-danubius.ro/index.php/eirp/article/ view/1350/1192. 
3 Available online at: http://revcurentjur.ro/old/arhiva/attachments_201201/ recjurid121_8F.pdf. 
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instruction, in the way in which CEDO defines the prosecuting charges. Although 
we admit the idea of the rights protection and the fundamental liberties in front of 
some abusive actions by instituting the fulfillment of the condition of the existence 
of the authorization given by the judge, we believe that, as far as the initiating of the 
prosecuting charges was not disposed in one cause, the judge shouldn’t get involved, 
because this intervention can be interpreted as a substitution of this to the official 
examinations, by developing other activities than those judicial, that take place 
within a criminal process.1 (Gradinaru, 2011, pp. 128-135) 
A compared analysis between the specifications regarding the problem discussed 
presents special importance, in the conditions where it is noticed, at the level of the 
European Union, a consolidation in the penal field, significant contributions in this 
respect being the principle of mutual recognition of the law decisions, the European 
mandate of arrest and the frame regarding the intensification of the cooperation in 
the field of combating terrorism and trans-border organized criminality. 
Thus, from the perspective of these considerations, we will present in detail below, 
as an exemplification, the legal specifications in the legislation of some countries, 
regarding the interception of communication. 
In the German system, listening to the conversations is allowed as long as there are 
enough clues to suppose that a person committed personally or as an accomplice, a 
serious crime (murder, genocide, rape, drug smuggling, organized crime, etc.). Also, 
in order to dispose of this measure, it is necessary that the supposition should be 
founded, a simple presumption being insufficient, and thus the investigations cannot 
be realized, aspect that supports the subsidiary character of the interceptions. 
(Gradinaru, Aspects of comparative law regarding the interceptions and audio or 
video recordings, 2011)2 
According to the German legislation, the authorization to wiretap and record a 
telephone phone conversations is issued if the suspect committed a crime against 
peace, high treason, or crimes endangering the safety of the democratic state, or 
against a land and endangering the international security, or if it was committed a 
crime against the capacity of defense of the state. At the same time, in the German 
law it is disposed this measure also if some person committed a crimes against the 
public order or has committed some deed to instigate or be an accomplice to escape, 
                                                             
1 Available online http://proceedings.univ-danubius.ro/index.php/eirp/article/download/740/667. 
2 Available online at http://www.proceedings.univ-danubius.ro/index.php/eirp/ article/view/739/666. 
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or instigation to rebel, done by a person without military quality, according to the 
article 16, article 19 reported to article 1, paragraph 3 from the Penal Law of the 
military staff. 
At the same time, the Code of German penal procedure also specifies the fact that 
ordering the interceptions must be done by the judge of instruction or, in case of 
emergency, by the prosecutor, whose decision must be confirmed by the judge within 
3 days, otherwise the order will be null. The order must be written and must contain 
the name and address of the person who will be intercepted. Actually, it must 
mention the type, volume and duration of the measure, which can be of maximum 3 
months. This duration can be extended though, until three months at the most, if the 
conditions provided by article 100a of the Penal Code are met.  
The authorization of the phone interception confers, the right to record the 
communications on magnetic tape or any other storage device. During the hearing, 
the Court has the possibility to opt between playing the tape or reading the 
transcripts. The interceptions and recordings on magnetic tape or any other type of 
support are done if there are founded clues regarding the preparation or committing 
a crime, for which the prosecution is done ex officio, and the interceptions and 
recording are imposed in order to find out the truth. The interception and the 
recording are done with the grounded authorization of the court, in the cases and 
conditions mentioned by the law, upon the prosecutor's request. 
In the English system, the interceptions and phone recording are regulated by 
Communication Act, 1985. They cannot be done without a mandate given by the 
Home Secretary, valid for 6 months, with possibility of renewal. 
The investigations are done by the police organs that, by means of authorization 
issued by the Home Secretary, can proceed to listening to the phone conversation in 
some cases especially mentioned: if the national security or the economic one of the 
country is in danger, or to prevent committing a crime sanctioned with prison for 
more than 3 years, or involving the use of violence, endangering an important 
financial interest, or is done by a large number of persons following the same 
purpose. 
The judge does not have any power of control over the interceptions, they not being 
under their motivated authorization. The person who discovers that they are listened 
to can exert the attack of appeal in front of a special court, formed by lawyers 
appointed by the government. The court thus informed has the obligation to verify if 
it was respected the legal conditions of being intercepted.  
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In the cause Malone vs. Great Britain1, the Court noticed that the phone interceptions 
are not subordinated to a mandate of the Ministry of Home Affairs and underlines 
the contradictions contained in the jurisprudence and government interpretation. In 
this case, the court noticed the lack of foreseeable character and, thus, the violation 
of article 8, since the “English right regarding the interception of the communication 
is quite obscure and the subject of divergent analyses [...] and does not indicate clear 
enough the extension and modalities of exercise of the discretionary power of the 
authorities in this field.” 
As per the opinion of a judge of the European Court (the opinion of judge Pettiti in 
the case Malone vs. The United Kingdom), the distinction between the 
administrative interceptions and the interceptions required by the judiciary bodies 
must be clearly provided by the national regulation, in order to respect art. 8 of the 
European Convention, thus favoring the application of the lawfulness of some 
interceptions in a juridical framework rather than the existence of a juridical void 
which permeates the arbitrary2. 
In the Belgian system, before 1994, there was no special law to regulate the 
interception of phone conversations, so that the judge of instruction was not 
authorized to order the interception. 
Beginning with the Law from 30 June 1994, the judge of instruction is allowed, for 
certain serious crimes, already consumed and limitedly mentioned, to authorize the 
listening to and recording of private conversations, and be informed about it. Also, 
regarding the period of time for this measure, the Code of Belgian procedure 
specifies the fact that the authorization can be given for a period of maximum one 
month, and it can be extended for one more month at a time, for six months 
maximum. 
In France, on 10 July 1991 was adopted Law no. 91-646 related to the secret of the 
correspondence, regulating the interception of the phone conversations, conferring a 
legal existence to the Inter- ministry Group of Control (I.G.C.) and interceptions. 
The law mentioned above authorizes two categories of interceptions, judiciary and 
administrative interceptions, respectively. Thus, the judiciary interceptions are, after 
                                                             
1 Malone v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 8691/79, Judgment 2 AUG 1984. 
2 Sandra Gradinaru, Aspects in Connection to the Interception and the Recording of Talks or 
Conversations Performed as per Law 51/1991 Regarding the National Security of the Romanian 
Country, EIRP Proceedings, Vol. 8, 2013, pp. 74-78, available online at: http://www.proceedings.univ-
danubius.ro/index.php/eirp/article /view/1445/1334. 
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the apparition of the mentioned law, specified and regulated beginning with article 
100 and until article 107 in the Code of penal procedure. This category of 
interceptions is ordered by the judge of instruction in the frame of a criminal or 
correctional business, when the necessity of gathering information is urgent and the 
punishment of prison specified by the law for that deed is equal to or more than 2 
years. The activity is done under the authority and control of the instruction judge 
who ordered it. (Renault-Brahinsky, 2008, p. 331) 
The decision of the instruction judge, settled for an initial duration of maximum 4 
months, can be extended by repeating the whole procedure, with the same conditions 
of form and duration in time and must comprise all the elements to identify the 
relations to intercept, the crime motivating the decision to intercept and the duration 
of the activity. 
The judge of instruction or the officer of judiciary police can ask the agents qualified 
in the field, to proceed to the installation of the device to intercept the phone 
conversations. They must write down a report for each operation to listen to and 
record, where it is mentioned the date and hour of beginning and end of the operation. 
The information obtained, but only the “documents of information useful in finding 
out the truth” are transcribed in a report, and the communication in foreign languages 
are transcribed in French with the assistance of an authorized interpreter. 
The supports to store the recordings are kept sealed. They are destroyed upon the 
Prosecutor Office's request, at the expiry of the duration of the public action started 
by the judiciary organs, an occasion to write a report of destruction. 
As for the interception of the phone conversations of the persons having the 
profession of a lawyer, judiciary assistant or parliamentary, it cannot be done unless 
the instruction judge informs the Council of the Bar association where the lawyer 
belongs, the president of the National Assembly or the Senate, respectively. 
The administrative interceptions are the phone security interceptions, authorized 
with extraordinary title by the Prime Minister, having as an object the research of 
some information of special nature, namely that regarding: “the national safety, the 
security of the scientific and economic potential of the country, the prevention of 
terrorism, criminality or organized crime, the prevention of restoration or 
maintenance of extremist groups.” 
At the same time, in the French legislation it is specified, in article 100-6 of the Code 
of penal procedure, that the recordings are destroyed, by the prosecutor's diligence, 
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at the expiry term of prescription of the public action. In this case, the instruction 
judge has the monopoly in the procedure of the interceptions. No legal disposition 
authorizes the judiciary police to proceed to intercept in the frame of a preliminary 
investigation. It is noted the fact that the specification mentioned is judicious, since 
the solutions not to start the penal tracking are not temporary, but also not final.  
In the Italian system, in order to impose an interception and recording of 
somebody's conversations, a representative of the Public Ministry must formulate a 
request to a judge for preliminary investigations, when it is considered that the 
interceptions are compulsory for the investigation. They will be authorized in case 
of crimes that are punished with prison for more than 5 years, crimes related to 
smuggling or drug smuggling or gun smuggling, or when the phone is used to 
commit a crime (such as a threat on the phone). 
The permit - to intercept conversations - can be obtained only for 15 days, yet it can 
be renewed.  
The results of the interceptions are transcribed in special regime, they can be made 
available for the accused’ council for the defense. In case of emergency, the Public 
Ministry can give up the judge's authorization for maximum 24 hours. In this 
situation, after the expiry of the term indicated, it is required to validate the operation 
by the instruction judge within 24 hours, otherwise the interceptions cannot be 
continued, and their results cannot be used.  
The persons responsible for the fight against mafia or anti-terrorism, benefits from 
special power to organize interceptions, avoiding this process.  
In the Spanish system, the intercepting of conversations is done according to the 
Law of penal procedure, having the name of “Ley de enjuiciamento criminal.” 
According to this law, the judge is the one who can authorize to retain the private, 
postal and telegraphic correspondence of the investigated person, as well as to open 
and check it, if there are clues that by these measures could be proved some deed or 
important circumstances for that investigation. 
Consequently, in the case Venezuela Contreras vs. Spain1, regarding the interception 
of a phone line in the frame of some penal investigation, the Court considered that 
the Spanish constitutional dispositions in the sense that “the secret of the 
communication and, particularly, the post, telegraphic and phone communication, is 
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guaranteed, except for when there is a judiciary disposition,” do not accomplish the 
condition of foreseeable character. Even though it accepted partially the support of 
the Government that the judge followed to observe the legal conditions (indicating 
in the Ordinance of that person, the crimes they were guilty of, the controlled phone 
line, the duration of interception, etc.), the Court drew the conclusion that the 
constitutional dispositions and those in the code of penal procedure were not clear 
enough in the moment of producing the events, and did not specify the extent and 
the modalities to exert the power to appreciate of the authorities in the field of 
interceptions. 
The measure to intercept can be disposed also by the Ministry of Home Affairs or, 
in its absence, by the Director for State Safety, but this disposition must be 
communicated compulsory to a competent judge. The latter, within at most 72 hours, 
can confirm or revoke this resolution.  
In the Danish legislation, the secret of the correspondence and communication can 
be violated only if there are grounded reasons to suspect that the correspondence 
comes or is for a person suspected for some deeds of penal nature. Breaking this 
fundamental right is presumed to be of essential importance for the development of 
the investigation and for it to have as an object a crime committed with intention and 
that is punished with prison for at least six years. 
The interception of the conversations can be authorized thus, if there are fulfilled the 
conditions mentioned above. The code of Danish penal procedure, in article 782 
paragraph 1, stipulates the necessity that the measure of interception should be 
proportional with the importance of the case. 
The measures to intercept and register, according to the Danish legislation, are 
disposed only by judge order. This must contain, according to the Danish Code, the 
phone number, addresses and circumstances specific to the case, and the duration of 
applying the measure must not be more than 4 weeks. 
In form of judge order, this duration of interception can be extended with 4 more 
weeks, every time when it is necessary. As in the case of the other legislations, in 
case of emergency, the measure can be taken by another judiciary organ. In this case, 
the measure can be disposed by the police, with the obligation that within 24 hours 
to inform the competent instance, and the latter will decide to maintain or cancel the 
measure, and in case it considers it necessary, it will inform the Ministry of Justice. 
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International Aspects Regarding Technical Surveillance Measures 
In the Anglo-Saxon legislation, due to the common law, the penal procedure has a 
form a lot different from the one in the law on the continent.  
Thus, in the United States of America, the means of proof are regulated by the law 
called Rules of evidence. By issuing this law, it results the fact that for the first time 
in the history of the United States there are laws of uniform rules regarding the proof 
admissibility in the procedure of the federal courts.  
The legislation of the USA has a series of specifications to limit the sphere of 
obtaining proofs, such as the rule called exclusionary rule with application in the 
incipient stage of the penal investigations, and specifying that a proof, even though 
it could be useful to solve some case, will not be used in court unless it was obtained 
observing the legal procedure.  
Another rule is that called the fruit of the poisonous tree specifying that, if a proof 
legally obtained is related to another proof that was illegally obtained, then the proof 
legally obtained will not be used in the trial.  
The federal rules regarding the proofs (Federal Rules of Evidence) that are incidents 
in the American penal trial settle that there are admitted the relevant proofs. This 
type of proofs means the “proof that has any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that determined the penal cause more or less probable than it would be without 
that proof”  
Even though the proof is relevant, it is possible not to be taken into consideration, if 
its proof value leads to causing an unfair prejudice, if confusion appears among the 
objects of the proof or if it is confusing for the jury. 
 
Echelon 
From the point of view of the breaches of technical supervision legislation, an 
analysis of the Echelon interceptions system, which has raised interest both at 
international and at European Union level, is relevant. 
Thus, on 5 July 2000, The Scientific and Technical Options Assessment program 
office (STOA) of the European Parliament established a commission to investigate 
the matter. 
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Echelon’s appearance raised the issue of violation of international conventions on 
protection against illegal intrusion into private life as well as the laws of states 
expressly stipulating the conditions and cases in which intrusion may occur from the 
point of view of technical surveillance.1 
Therefore, the system known as “Echelon” is an interception system that differs from 
other information systems because it possesses two characteristics that make it quite 
unusual: 
1. the first such feature is the ability to perform quasi-total surveillance. In particular, 
satellite reception stations and espionage satellites enable them to intercept any 
telephone, fax, internet or e-mail sent by any person and inspects their content. 
2. the second unusual feature of Echelon is that the system operates globally on a 
multi-state basis (UK, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), giving greater 
value compared to national systems. Thus, Echelon participating States can place 
their interception systems at the disposal of the other, share the costs and share the 
resulting information. 
The Temporary Committee of the European Parliament on the Echelon interception 
system, in its report to the European Parliament on 18 May 20012, reveals that there 
is indeed a global system for intercepting communications, which works through 
cooperation between the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand under the UKUSA Agreement3.  
It also shows that its name is ECHELON, given the evidence analyzed, and its 
purpose is to intercept commercial and private communications rather than military 
ones. 
Therefore, the Council at the plenary sitting of 30 March 2000 stated that “cannot 
accept the creation or existence of a telecommunications interception system which 
                                                             
1 Gradinaru, (fn. 1), p. 352. 
2 Report on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial 
communications (ECHELON interception system) (2001/2098(INI) available online at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A5-2001-
0264+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
3 The United Kingdom – United States of America Agreement (UKUSA) is a multilateral agreement 
for cooperation in signals intelligence between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. The alliance of intelligence operations is also known as the Five Eyes. In 
classification markings this is abbreviated as FVEY, with the individual countries being abbreviated as 
AUS, CAN, NZL, GBR, and USA, respectively. 
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does not respect the laws of the Member States and which violates the fundamental 
principles aimed at protecting human dignity”.  
In this context, the European Parliament resolution on the existence of a global 
system for the interception of private and commercial communications (Echelon 
interception system) (2001/2098(INI))1, established numerous counteracting 
measures. 
 
Conclusion 
The possibility of technical surveillance by state authorities is provided for in the 
legislation of all the signatory states of the European Convention on Human Rights 
as well as of the states on other continents that benefit from advanced technology 
and an appropriate legislative framework to fight crime. 
Increasing global crime requires that judicial bodies have reciprocal competencies 
in the context in which the admissibility of evidence obtained in a country, other than 
the one in which the criminal investigation is conducted, involves extensive 
discussions and may raise obstacles in the conduct of criminal proceedings. 
Thus, the need for judicial co-operation in criminal matters required a continuous 
adaptation of legislation at European level to harmonize the fundamental differences 
of national criminal systems. 
We note that the procedural rules developed under the aegis of the UN, the European 
regulations representing the creation of the European Union and the Council of 
Europe, as well as the national ones, show a great similarity in the procedure that is 
to be followed in order to legally perform this intrusion in private life, fact that attests 
the success of the theoretical harmonization.  
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